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Abstract
What is the relationship between complexity in the world and complexity in the
mind? Intuitively, increasingly complex objects and events should give rise to in-
creasingly complex mental representations (or perhaps a plateau in complexity after
a certain point). However, a counterintuitive possibility with roots in information
theory is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the “objective” complexity of
some stimulus and the complexity of its mental representation, because excessively
complex patterns might be characterized by surprisingly short computational descrip-
tions (e.g., if they are represented as having been generated “randomly”). Here, we
demonstrate that this is the case, using a novel approach that takes the notion of
“description” literally. Subjects saw static and dynamic visual stimuli whose objec-
tive complexity could be carefully manipulated, and they described these stimuli in
their own words by giving freeform spoken descriptions of them. Across three exper-
iments totaling over 10,000 speech clips, spoken descriptions of shapes (Experiment
1), dot-arrays (Experiment 2), and dynamic motion-paths (Experiment 3) revealed a
striking quadratic relationship between the raw complexity of these stimuli and the
length of their spoken descriptions. In other words, the simplest and most complex
stimuli received the shortest descriptions, while those stimuli with a “medium” de-
gree of complexity received the longest descriptions. Follow-up analyses explored the
particular words used by subjects, allowing us to further explore how such stimuli
were represented. We suggest that the mind engages in a kind of lossy compression
for overly complex stimuli, and we discuss the utility of such freeform responses for
exploring foundational questions about mental representation.
Keywords: complexity; representation; language; information theory
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1 Introduction
Objects and events frequently strike us as being simple or complex. A painting, for
example, may be plain and minimalistic, or it may be elaborate and embellished; a
highway system may be sparse and direct, or it may be dense and interconnected;
even a story may be linear and straightforward, or it may twist and branch.
Although complexity can be found across the natural, artificial, and social world,
the most pervasive and striking impressions of complexity are surely those that arise
from visual images. For example, consider the pairs of images in Figure 1. Visual
stimuli as diverse as flowers, abstract shapes, digital arrays, and patterns of motion
all give rise to powerful impressions of complexity: For each pair, the image on the
right is immediately perceived as more complex than the image on the left.
What is the nature of this experience, and how can we investigate it scientifically?
Though mental representations of complexity have been of great interest both histor-
ically and recently (Attneave, 1957; Berlyne, 1958, 1970; Berlyne & Peckham, 1966;
Biederman, 1987; Chater, 1996; Chipman & Mendelson, 1979; Cutting & Garvin,
1987; Feldman, 2016; Forsythe et al., 2011; Lewis & Frank, 2016; Madan et al., 2018;
Oliva et al., 2004; Rosenholtz et al., 2007; Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980; Spehar
et al., 2003; van der Helm, 2000; Watson, 2011; Wilder et al., 2016), all attempts to
study psychological representations of complexity confront at least two major chal-
lenges: (1) the extreme variability in the kinds of stimuli that give rise to experiences
of complexity (as shown by the diversity of images in Figure 1), and (2) the near-
ineffable nature of the experiences themselves. Indeed, because of how difficult it
can be to craft the right kinds of questions or measures to probe experiences of com-
plexity, researchers have either supplied subjects with long and specific definitions of
complexity to be used in rating scales (Berlyne & Peckham, 1966; Madan et al., 2018;
Oliva et al., 2004; Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980), or they have developed measures
that get at such experiences only very indirectly, such as asking for the name some-
one would give to an object, probing related notions such as its aesthetic appeal, or
measuring the subject’s ability to detect the object in noise (Alvarez & Cavanagh,
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Simple Complex
Figure 1: Examples of images that evoke impressions of complexity. The experience
of complexity can span an extremely wide range of stimuli, including images that are
natural, artificial, digital, and dynamic.
2004; Biederman, 1987; Lewis & Frank, 2016; Spehar et al., 2003; Wilder et al., 2016).
Some researchers have even thought that such experiences are impossible to study in
any unified way, and that instead the best we can hope to do is determine complexity
according to the particular sociological and psychological context that a subject finds
herself in (Simon, 1972).
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Here, we explore a new and different experimental approach to both of these
challenges, and use this approach to tackle a longstanding question about the psy-
chological experience of complexity: What is the relationship between “objective”
complexity in the world and the complexity of one’s “subjective” internal represen-
tations?
1.1 Complexity as “description length”
A long tradition in computer science, information theory, and psychology conceives
the complexity of a stimulus (e.g., an image, a sequence of numbers, a coded message,
etc.) in terms of the length of its shortest description (Chaitin, 1969, 1975; Feldman,
2016; Feldman & Singh, 2006; Kolmogorov, 1965; Leeuwenberg, 1969; Shannon, 1948;
van der Helm et al., 1992; Wallace, 2005). A natural and popular way to think of such
descriptions is to imagine the computer program that one would write to reproduce
some stimulus (as in the case of Kolmogorov complexity; Kolmogorov, 1965). For ex-
ample, suppose you were asked to infer the computer program that produced the out-
puts shown in Figure 2. How would you encode an output string such as the 12 digits
in “1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1”? One program that might produce this string would
be approximately as long as the string itself — for example, a command like “print
(1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1)”. But a shorter program would “compress” this out-
put — perhaps something more like “print [1]*12” (which could scale up to much
longer strings; for example, a program to produce a thousand 1’s needn’t be much
longer: “print [1]*1000”). A key feature of this notion of complexity is that in-
creasingly complex strings are described by increasingly long programs: For example,
the slightly more complex 12-character string “0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1” might be
produced by the slightly longer program “print [0,1]*6”; and the even more com-
plex 12-character string “0,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,1,1” would require an even longer
program — perhaps “print [([0]*N,[1]*N) for N in range(3)]”. The minimal-
description-length conception of complexity thus offers a precise and rigorous way to
capture an intuition we may have about the nature of complexity, which is that more



























Figure 2: The relationship between complexity and description length might be best
understood by analogy. Consider each of the binary strings appearing above (white),
and then ask yourself what sort of computer program might have produced them
(green). At first, increasingly complex outputs seem likely to have been generated
by increasingly long programs. But when the output becomes so complex as to seem
random (last row), it might best be summarized by a shorter program (such as one
using a random number generator), instead of printing digits individually. Might a
similar pattern hold for mental representations of complexity? (Programs here are
written in Python pseudocode.)
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Crucially, however, this same framework faces a puzzle when it comes to extremely
complex stimuli. For example, consider the final output string in Figure 2; what is
the minimal program for producing that string? That string seems — and is — highly
incompressible, and so the minimal program for producing it may genuinely be the
one that simply reiterates the string itself (i.e., a very long “print” statement). But
another possibility is that this string is best described as being randomly generated;
perhaps the program that created it simply chose random 1’s and 0’s, and the par-
ticular sequence that resulted — i.e., this sequence of random 1’s and 0’s rather than
some other, equally random, sequence — isn’t what’s most essential. On one hand,
this approach might be described as a kind of “lossy” compression, in that informa-
tion about the string is inevitably lost by a program that simply treats the output as
random. But on the other hand, this may well be the most fitting description of the
sequence. In other words, it may actually be reasonable to infer that the program
that produced this output really did just pick 1’s and 0’s at random.
This pattern raises an intriguing psychological question: If we represent complex-
ity (as exemplified in Figure 1 and as explored in the relevant literatures; Attneave,
1957; Berlyne, 1958, 1970; Chater, 1996; Chipman and Mendelson, 1979; Cutting and
Garvin, 1987; Feldman, 2016; Forsythe et al., 2011; Lewis and Frank, 2016; Madan
et al., 2018; Rosenholtz et al., 2007; van der Helm, 2000; Watson, 2011), how do
our minds confront this representational challenge? Do increasingly complex stim-
uli (as characterized by some objective metric) give rise to increasingly long internal
descriptions? Or might there be an inflection point, such that complexity beyond a
certain threshold is somehow represented using fewer resources or shorter internal
descriptions?
Indeed, it has long been speculated that the “objective” complexity of a visual
stimulus might not predict its corresponding subjective complexity in a monotonic
fashion (Donderi, 2006; Wolfram, 2002); but this has been difficult to demonstrate ex-
perimentally, in part because of the challenges mentioned earlier. For example, in the
most comprehensive review of recent work on visual complexity, Donderi considered
the extreme case of random images, and concluded as follows:
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“We cannot detect the structure in a random image. This suggests that
the subjective complexity of an image will be at a maximum somewhere
between simple order and complete randomness. [...] From this it follows
that subjective complexity might be an inverted U-function, rather than
a monotonic function, of algorithmic complexity. There is at present no
objective evidence about this.” (Donderi, 2006)
Recent work does offer clues that this might be the case. For example, it has
recently been shown that children preferentially allocate attention to visual and au-
ditory events that are neither too predictable nor too surprising, with a preference
instead for “Goldilocks” stimuli with moderate complexity (Kidd et al., 2012, 2014).
Other work suggests that Prägnanz or perceptual “goodness” should be most likely
to arise neither for uniform patterns (with zero entropy) nor for maximally noisy
patterns (with very high entropy), but instead again for moderately entropic pat-
terns (Koenderink et al., 2018). Still, this work focuses only on very specific types
of stimuli, and does not necessarily aim to study the encoding of complexity per se,
in the manner of the minimal program example explored above. Could a completely
different kind of evidence make progress on this question?
1.2 The present experiments: Taking “description length”
literally
Here, we take a different approach, by introducing a new measure of subjective com-
plexity based in natural language. In addition to its communicative function, language
is often conceived as mirroring human mental processes and reflecting the character
of thought, in part because of its status as a generative process that uses a combi-
natorial system of rules to generate an unbounded range of expressions (Chomsky,
1957, 1968). In light of this, our approach is to explore internal representations of
complexity by taking the notion of “description length” literally. We ask subjects
simply to describe, in their own words, a variety of stimuli whose complexity —
and in particular, with “compressibility” could be systematically varied. We then
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examine the length of the “verbal programs” that subjects freely generate, taking
the length of such descriptions as proxies for the complexity of the relevant internal
representations.∗
To achieve this, we created a pipeline to collect auditory recordings of subjects
verbally describing static and dynamic visual stimuli using the microphones of their
home computers, and then transcribed these recordings into text. We hypothesized
that the length of such descriptions (e.g., the number of words appearing in a tran-
script of a given audio description) would be related to the complexity of the stimulus
being described (as determined by an independent measure) — but not linearly or
monotonically. Instead, we asked whether subjects’ free descriptions might confirm
the speculation that moderately complex stimuli have the longest description lengths,
resulting in a quadratic relationship between the objective complexity of a stimu-
lus and the length of its corresponding verbal description. Across three experiments
spanning several types of visual stimuli, we collected over 10,000 independent audio
recordings, and discovered that this is indeed the case — with an inverted-U-shaped
function relating objective complexity to verbal description length.
2 Audio collection and processing pipeline (for all
experiments)
All of the experiments reported here involved the collection of freely-spoken descrip-
tions of visual stimuli. We adopted a standardized procedure to establish a pipeline
for gathering and processing these descriptions. All subjects were recruited online
via Amazon Mechanical Turk. (For a discussion about the reliability of this subject
pool, see Crump et al., 2013.) Prior to the experiment, all participants consented to
have their voice recorded. (Such voice recording, as well as every other experimental
procedure described below, was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Johns
∗See Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, for an early articulation of this general hypothesis and
approach, though with a prediction that is in some ways similar to ours and in other ways opposite:
“Random-appearing sequences are those whose verbal description is longest” (p.436).
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Hopkins University.) To ensure that the recordings would be easily processed and
transcribed, we required that all participants be native speakers of English, and we
instructed them to take any necessary steps to minimize external noise from interfer-
ing with the audio quality (e.g., background music, loud street sounds, conversations
by other people, etc.). Subjects then completed a short test to ensure that their home
setup could indeed record and upload audio; only if they successfully uploaded a test
audio recording to our server were participants able to access the next stage of the
experiment.
An experimental trial proceeded as follows. A stimulus (e.g., a shape, an array
of dots, or a moving object) was shown on the display, and subjects were told to
“just describe what you see on the screen”. When subjects felt ready, they pressed
a “Record” button and spoke a description into their microphone. The interface
allowed subjects to start, end, replay, re-record and upload their audio descriptions
however they pleased. Once they were satisfied with the description they gave, they
pressed an “Upload” button to transfer their audio file to an internal server. The
interface allowed subjects to record as long a description as they liked, but subjects
were also given some very gentle (but unenforced) guidelines: “Your description can
be as long or as short as you’d like, from just a few seconds up to a whole minute if
you feel that is necessary. (No need to go overboard though: If you’re spending more
than a minute on one shape, that’s probably longer than you need to.)”
To transcribe the audio recordings, we used the Google Speech Recognition API
from the Python library “SpeechRecognition” (Version 3.8) (Zhang, 2017, https://
github.com/Uberi/speech recognition). To validate the accuracy of this tool, we first
ran a short pilot study using the procedure described above; the audio clips from
this pilot were then transcribed both by the API and an experimenter (author Z.S.).
A comparison of these two transcriptions revealed a high degree of overlap: The
experimenter’s transcription and the API’s transcription agreed about the number of
words in a description to a degree of 95% (i.e., the average disagreement in number
of words for a given file was only 4.7%), and they agreed about the identity of the




Figure 3: Audio collection and transcription pipeline for all of the present experi-
ments. Participants viewed stimuli on their home computer and described them in
their own words. They then uploaded the audio file of their description to a Web
server, and the file was transcribed by speech-to-text software.
homophones, such as a subject saying “U shape” and the API transcribing this as
“you shape”.) Given that our primary interest was in the length of these descriptions
— and, in particular, their relative length — this degree of overlap encouraged us
that the transcription tool was sufficiently reliable for analyzing thousands of such
speech clips.
Pre-registrations: For each experiment, we pre-registered the sample size, ex-
perimental design (including the general nature of the stimuli, as well as the number
of trials, and the experimental procedure), as well as the main analysis (and occa-
sionally some secondary analyses); all experiments below follow these pre-registered
details. Importantly, however, we intentionally chose not to pre-register a prediction
about the particular way in which complexity and description length (i.e., number of
words) would be related; with little precedent for this kind of experiment, we wanted
to be open to multiple possibilities, and so our pre-registered hypothesis was sim-
ply that complexity would be related to description length (without assuming the
specific nature of that relationship; for example, in Experiment 1, we pre-registered
both a linear and a quadratic model). For data analyses, we pre-registered the pri-
mary variables of interest (e.g., in Experiment 1, skeletal complexity of a shape as
an independent variable, and number of words as a dependent variable), exclusion
criteria, and a regression examining the relationship between stimulus complexity
and the average number of words that stimulus would receive. We report all of these
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pre-registered analyses below; however, we also report several variations, including
additional analyses that occurred to us after examining the data, as well as improve-
ments to our analyses suggested by reviewers (such as using mixed-effects models that
include random-effects terms for subjects and items). Where relevant, we indicate
below which results reflect pre-registered analyses and which are exploratory.
An archive of the data, experiment code, stimuli, experiment pre-registrations,
analysis code, and other relevant materials is available at https://osf.io/a57gy/.
3 Experiment 1: Shape
Are increasingly complex stimuli mirrored by increasingly complex internal represen-
tations? Or might such factors be related non-monotonically, or even quadratically?
Our first experiment explored this question using freely spoken verbal descriptions
of shapes. Geometric shapes have a long history as a stimulus class in studies of
perceived complexity (Attneave, 1957), and they are appropriate here too for several
reasons. First, it is striking just how readily such shapes can evoke powerful (and
variable) impressions of complexity: Simply drawing one kind of blob on a page rather
than another kind of blob causes one to have a strong impression of its complexity
that is easily compared across stimuli; for example, you can easily see that the three
shapes in the top row of Figure 4 are changing in their complexity. Second, recent
advances in computational geometry allow for a succinct and standardized measure
of a shape’s “objective” complexity, based on their internal “skeletal” structure (see
below), allowing us to vary the objective complexity of a shape in a systematic way.
Third, such shapes tend to have few (if any) previous associations: Whereas familiar
objects such as tools, animals, or paintings may also vary in their complexity, it can
be difficult to disentangle the different factors that contribute to their complexity
(which may encompass not only how they look but also knowledge of their function,
origin, social significance, etc.). These three factors make geometric shapes ideal can-
didates for isolating, measuring, and manipulating complexity per se, and so we used




As stated in our pre-registration, we aimed for 240 usable subjects for this experiment;
to reach this target sample, we recruited 260 subjects total (since we expected a small
number of subjects to drop out of the study or upload untranscribable audio files).
3.1.2 Stimuli
We adopted an algorithmic procedure to generate a variety of novel shapes that varied
in their complexity. For each shape, we first defined the number of sides that the
object would ultimately have, and then created a set of randomly located points that
would serve as the vertices of the shape’s edges. We then connected these points using
the method of Delaunay Triangulation, which maximizes the minimum angles formed
by the overall structure of the connected lines. Next, facets along the boundary of this
triangle mesh were removed until the resulting polygon had the predefined number
of sides. Finally, for each shape, the edges of the resulting polygon were smoothed in
order appear more natural.
160 objects were generated using the procedure mentioned above, ranging from
3-sided objects to 34-sided objects, with 5 instances of each N-sided object (Figure 4).
Though the nature of online experiments prevents us from knowing the exact visual
properties of our stimuli as they appeared to subjects, each shape was approximately
500 pixels wide.
To calculate the “objective” complexity of each shape, we first derived its medial
axis skeleton, classically defined as the set of points having two or more closest points
on the shape’s perimeter (Blum, 1973). The skeleton of a shape might be thought of
as its “blueprint”: the internal structure that explains why a shape has the external
features it does. Shape skeletons capture many aspects of a shape’s large- and small-
scale organization, including not only the number of “parts” a shape has (Siddiqi
et al., 1996) but also how these parts are configured with respect to one another,
and even to some extent the complexity of each part itself (since the shape of a
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skeletal branch captures the shape of its corresponding part). Shape skeletons are also
psychologically plausible, with growing empirical evidence that they are computed
and represented by human vision (Ayzenberg et al., 2019; Ayzenberg & Lourenco,
2019; Firestone & Scholl, 2014; Lowet et al., 2018; Sun & Firestone, 2021; Wilder
et al., 2011). To turn this representation into a measure of complexity, we followed
previous work (including Sun and Firestone, 2021) in computing the integral of the
turning angle along each skeletal branch, summed over the total number of branches
(using ShapeToolBox1.0; Feldman and Singh, 2006). An intuitive way to capture
this measure might be to imagine a person walking along the skeleton of a shape;
the more often this person changes direction (such that their next step was not easily
predictable from their previous step), the greater the complexity of their “walk”,
and so the greater the complexity of the shape itself. What results is a measure
of the “amount of information” required to describe the shape in terms of its basic
underlying structure.
3.1.3 Procedure
Each experimental session consisted of 20 trials, following the data collection pipeline
described above. On each trial, participants saw a novel shape and were asked to de-
scribe it. (For this experiment, we added the suggestion that the subjects’ description
should be sufficient to allow someone to draw this shape.) To ensure that subjects
saw a wide range of complex shapes, the 20 stimuli for a given subject were selected
from the broader pool of 160 shapes pseudorandomly, with equal spacing throughout
the range of complex shapes as ranked by our objective measure of shape complexity.
The shapes were shown in a newly generated random order for each subject.
As stated in our pre-registration, we excluded any subject whose average spoken
description length was less than 5 words long (since we suspected that such subjects
were not very engaged in the task), or whose entire set of audio files could not be
recognized by the speech recognition software. We also excluded any subjects who
did not complete the HIT. At the level of individual trials, we excluded any audio
file whose transcribed description was only 1 word long, or any files that couldn’t be
13










Figure 4: Sample stimuli and complexity measures from the three experiments re-
ported here. Experimet 1: A sample shape with its medial-axis skeleton inset. Ex-
periment 2: Matrices of dots, ranked according to how “organized” or “disorganized”
they appear. Experiment 3: Paths of a moving dot, ranked according to the number
of changes in the dot’s trajectory.
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read or transcribed by the speech recognizer. Very occasionally, we failed to obtain
a complete dataset from a subject who otherwise completed the entire experimental
session (e.g., they completed all 20 trials, but successfully uploaded only 18 audio
files to our server); when that happened, we chose to keep their data for the purposes
of our analyses.
3.1.4 Analysis
Our primary interest here is in the number of words subjects used to describe the
shapes (though see Section 6 below for follow-up analyses that examine the content
of such descriptions). To this end, we averaged the “verbal description length” of all
the descriptions provided for each of the 160 shapes. We then modeled the relationship
between average verbal description length and the “objective” description length of
the shape’s skeletons (as described above), using a 2nd-degree polynomial regression.
Given that we were interested in relative differences in this quantity, we nor-
malized the average length of each participant’s descriptions to the grand mean of
all descriptions; in other words, the particular tendency of a given subject to give
very long or very short descriptions (relative to the group) was factored out from
any subsequent modeling, by rescaling that subject’s average description length to
the average description length of the cohort as a whole. (However, no result we re-
port below depends in any way on this normalization procedure; in other words, all
trends and effects remain statistically significant, in the same direction, even without
normalizing description lengths.)
3.2 Results and discussion
9 subjects were excluded for giving extremely short descriptions or uploading low-
quality audio files, leaving 251 subjects with analyzable data. From these subjects,
4897 audio clips were successfully uploaded to the server (indicating a rate of suc-
cessful uploading of 97.5%). Of these files, 546 (11%) could not be processed as
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Figure 5: Sample descriptions from a participant in Experiment 1. Six objects from
the stimulus pool are shown here, in order of skeletal complexity, with their medial-
axis skeletons inset (in the actual experiment, these objects appeared as outlined
shapes, without their skeletons, and in a random order). Each bar show the transcript
of the description that the participant spoke. (The few transcribing errors shown here
— e.g., “you shape” instead of “U shape” — are representative of the broader sample,
and so are left intact here for reference.) You can hear these spoken descriptions for
yourself at https://perceptionresearch.org/speaking.
as input but not transcribed; finally, another 132 (2.7%) were excluded for being
only one word long. This left 3818 audio files included in our final analysis (78%
of all uploaded files), resulting in approximately 24 unique descriptions for each of
the 160 shapes. The average duration of these included speech files was 23 sec-
onds (MIN=2, MAX=62, SD=14), and the average description length was 41 words
(MIN=2, MAX=215, SD=31).
Figure 5 shows sample descriptions from six trials of one participant. As you
can see, this subject gives short descriptions for simple shapes, and then increases
the length of his descriptions as shape complexity increases. Crucially, however, this
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pattern breaks past a certain point: Once the shapes become excessively complex,
the participant’s descriptions shorten again, producing a distinct inverted-U relating
description length to objective complexity.
Indeed, this pattern was evident across the subject pool as a whole. Figure 6
(Experiment 1) shows the average description length of all 160 shapes and all 3818
audio files. As may be clear from visual inspection alone, description length does not
increase monotonically with objective complexity; instead, it plateaus at a moderate-
to-high degree of complexity, before dipping down again for the most complex objects.
Indeed, when the data are fit to a 2nd-degree polynomial, this analysis reveals the
expected inverted-U-shaped relationship between objective complexity and the length
of verbal descriptions (R2 = 0.41 , F (2, 157) = 55.36 , p = 2.20 × 10−16)†. Crucially
for our purposes, the coefficient of the squared term was significantly negative (and
the addition of the quadratic term substantially improved variance explained over and
above the simple linear regression model [b = −33.59, 95%CI = [−45.27,−21.91], t =
−5.68, p = 6.36 × 10−8]) — whereas it might have been (undetectably different from)
zero if the pattern had been linear, or even positive if there were some other pattern.
This pattern suggests a “Goldilocks” relationship between an object’s complexity
and the length of its corresponding description: moderately complex objects yielded
the longest verbal descriptions, while less or more complex objects yielded shorter
descriptions.
Due to there being multiple observations per subject, we also fit the data to
a mixed-effects model that included subject and shape as random effects; this ex-
ploratory analysis also revealed a significant quadratic term for the relationship be-
tween complexity and number of words (b = −141.34, 95%CI = [−190.29,−92.19],
t = −5.61, p < 1.13 × 10−7))‡.
This broader pattern may also be seen in a “binned” version of the data. To further
examine how description length changes as the complexity enhances, we grouped the
†We also pre-registered a simple linear model in addition to the quadratic model. Here, the
linear model explained a significant proportion of variance (R2 = 0.29 , F (1, 158) = 65.5 , p =
1.46 × 10−13).
‡We thank a reviewer for suggesting this analysis.
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stimuli into five levels based on skeletal complexity (Figure 6, second row), with each
level containing 32 objects. An one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) reveals a
significant effect of objective complexity (F (1, 158) = 53.3, p = 1.32 × 10−16, η2 =
0.25), and the follow-up trend analysis showed that the quadratic component is highly
significant (b = −34.79, 95%CI = [−45.27,−21.91] , t = −4.83, p = 3.22 × 10−6).
These results provide initial evidence of an inverted-U-shaped relationship between
the complexity of a stimulus and the length of its corresponding description. In other
words, instead of generating longer and longer “verbal programs” to encode more and
more complex stimuli, participants generated the longest expressions for moderately
complex stimuli, apparently willing to “lose” information about such stimuli (perhaps
as in the bottom panel of Figure 2).
4 Experiment 2: Organization
The previous experiment found that the length of verbal descriptions that subjects
generated for simple and complex novel shapes was captured by a non-linear (and
perhaps even quadratic) function of the shapes’ objective complexity. However, it
remains unclear whether this pattern truly shows a decline in description length past
a certain complexity level (rather than, e.g., a plateau or leveling off). Moreover,
Experiment 1 explored only one type of stimulus, which varied in only one type of
way — in particular, the addition of information along the skeleton of a shape. By
contrast, the experience of complexity spans a strikingly wide range of categories (as
in Figure 1); how robust, then, is this pattern? And how far does it generalize?
Experiment 2 repeated the design of Experiment 1 with a brand new set (and
kind) of stimuli — arrays of colored dots. Unlike novel shapes whose complexity
varies as a function of their internal structure, the stimuli we used in this experiment
were composed of nearly identical elements (36 blueish dots), such that the impression
of their complexity derived from their grouping or organization. Grouping describes
the impression that certain elements “go together”, and is a pervasive experience
that, at least in principle, holds over any kind of segmented stimulus. This process
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is often thought to exist for precisely the sorts of reasons we explore here: to reduce
the amount of information required to encode visual patterns (Leeuwenberg, 1967;
van der Helm et al., 1992; Wagemans et al., 2012) — since a highly organized or
regular pattern is more easily compressed than a disorganized, irregular, or random
pattern.
Experiment 2 thus used stimuli that varied in exactly this way: patterns of dots
whose arrangement varied from highly organized to highly random. Though complex-
ity here was determined by a rather different process (i.e., the addition of randomness,
as opposed to the addition of structure), what unites both of these classes of stimuli
is their varying “compressibility”; shapes with more branches, and arrays with more
randomness, are both less compressible, which is the notion of complexity we explore
here. This approach thus allowed us to ask whether the pattern from Experiment
1 would generalize to a new kind of stimulus, and also provided an opportunity to
discover a more robust inverted-U-shaped trend.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Subjects
As stated in our pre-registration, we aimed for 300 usable subjects for this experiment;
to reach this target sample, we recruited 320 subjects total.
4.1.2 Stimuli and Procedure
To generate the stimuli for this experiment, we adapted a procedure from earlier work
for manipulating the degree of perceptual organization in a matrix of dots (Barbot et
al., 2018); previous work using similar grid patterns also shows that greater random-
ness in such matters correlates with greater perceived complexity (Falk & Konold,
1997). We generated a library of 6 × 6 matrices of dots, appearing in six different
shades of blue (Figure 4, second row). Each matrix was created by combining some
proportion of a “maximally grouped” matrix (in particular, a matrix where each
row [or column] had a uniform color, and each adjacent column [or row] progressed
19
smoothly from one shade to another) and a “maximally ungrouped” matrix (in par-
ticular, a matrix where the positions of all the same dots were shuffled randomly, with
the additional constraint that no adjacent dots had the same shade). The degree of
organization was then determined by biased sampling from the two matrices. For
example, a matrix with a “disorganization level” of 80% would have 20% of its dots
drawn from the maximally grouped parent matrix, and 80% of its dots drawn from
the maximally ungrouped parent matrix, whereas a matrix with a “disorganization
level” of 10% would have 90% of its dots drawn from the maximally grouped parent
matrix, and 10% of its dots drawn from the maximally ungrouped parent matrix.
Using this procedure, we generated 140 matrices total: 20 each from 7 different levels
of disorganization or randomness (0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 50%, 80%, 100%)†. Figure
4 shows three examples of these images, at disorganization levels of 10%, 50%, and
100%.
The design was otherwise the same as in Experiment 1, with only a few small
changes. Each experimental session consisted of 14 trials (2 matrices from each of the
7 levels, in a random order). Additionally, subjects’ instructions were even simpler
than in Experiment 1: they were told only to “describe the array” (not to do so in
a way that could allow someone else to draw it), giving them maximum freedom to
generate their description in whatever way felt most natural and intuitive.
4.2 Results and discussion
6 subjects were excluded for giving extremely short descriptions or uploading low-
quality audio files, leaving 314 subjects with analyzable data. From these subjects,
4320 audio clips were successfully uploaded to the server (indicating a rate of suc-
cessful uploading of 98.3%). Of these files, 51 (1.2%) could not be processed as
audio input by the speech recognition software, and 222 (5.1%) could be processed
as input but not transcribed; finally, another 56 (1.3%) were excluded for being
†Careful readers will note that our description here essentially reverses the meaning of “disorga-
nization level” as described in our pre-registration (where 0% meant highly random and 100% meant
highly organized). On reflection, we found our pre-registered naming convention to be less intuitive,
but in fact the procedure we follow here is identical to the one specified in the pre-registration.
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only one word long. This left 3991 audio files included in our final analysis (92.4%
of all uploaded files), resulting in approximately 29 unique descriptions for each
of the 140 arrays. The average duration of these included speech files was 19 sec-
onds (MIN=3, MAX=62, SD=11), and the average description length was 35 words
(MIN=2, MAX=148, SD=22).
As can be seen in Figure 6, a similar inverted-U-shaped pattern emerged again:
Highly grouped and highly random matrices were tersely described, while moderately
grouped arrays garnered the longest descriptions. As before, a 2nd-degree polynomial
model revealed this inverted-U relationship between matrix complexity and descrip-
tion length (R2 = 0.58, F (2, 137) = 93.06, p < 2.20 × 10−16), again with a signifi-
cantly negative squared-complexity term (b = −13.85, 95%CI = [−19.87,−7.83], t =
−4.55, p < 1.18 × 10−5)§. Similarly, a mixed-effects model with subject and matrix
as random effects revealed this significant quadratic complexity effect (b = −81.41,
95%CI = [−117.77,−45.05], t = −4.83, p < 2.28 × 10−5).¶
This experiment thus generalizes the “Goldilocks” pattern from Experiment 1 to
an entirely new kind of stimulus — one whose complexity derives from the organiza-
tion of otherwise-identical perceptual elements — and shows this inverted-U-shaped
pattern even more conclusively (as you may see in Figure 6). ‖
§We pre-registered both a linear model and an exponential model in addition to the quadratic
model, to explore whether there would be a reliable decline in description length at high levels of
complexity. However, as inspection of the data reveals (Figure 6), the data were not patterned
according to a growth exponential model. Instead, we used a least square regression to fit the data
to a decay exponential function y = b1e
b2x+b3; none of the coefficients were significant (b1 : p = 0.92;
b2 : p = 0.92; b3 : p = 0.94). A linear model (R
2 = 0.51, F (1, 158) = 144.8 , p < 2.20 × 10−16)
explained a significant proportion of variance.
¶Note that the plot in Figure 6 for this experiment shows a local polynomial regression (also
known as a LOESS regression), which is often more appropriate when one variable has a limited
range — which was true here in Experiment 2 but not in Experiments 1 or 3 (since no matrix can
be less organized than 0% or more organized than 100%, whereas shapes can in principle increase
in complexity indefinitely). However, the statistics we report here are for the standard polynomial
regression, as in Experiment 1 and as described in our pre-registration.
‖Simonsohn 2018 proposes a “two-lines” test to demonstrate U-shaped relationships, to avoid
possible false positives that can arise from quadratic regression. This approach sets a ‘break point’
of the independent variable and then uses two separate linear regressions to test for both an upward
trend and a downward trend, requiring two slopes with opposite signs that are both significant.
Though our experiments were not designed for this analysis (and we did not pre-register it), we note
that the current data showed a fairly consistent pattern even under this new test. For Experiment 1,
we set the break point at x = 0.52, and found a significant positive line before 0.52 (F (1, 94) = 39.12 ,
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Figure 6: Results from Experiments 1–3, plotting data from over 10,000 freely gen-
erated verbal descriptions. Across shapes, matrices and motion-paths, we observed
a consistent pattern relating objective complexity and linguistic descriptions: Par-
ticipants spoke relatively short descriptions for both very simple and very complex
stimuli, using the greatest number of words for describing moderately complex stim-
uli. In the top row, each dot represents a unique stimulus (e.g., a shape, matrix, or
motion-path). The bottom row plots the same data in ‘bins’, where each dot col-
lapses over multiple stimuli from a given complexity range, which may help visualize
patterns that are not as clearly evident in the top row.
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5 Experiment 3: Dynamic Stimuli
The first two experiments explored very different kinds of visual stimuli, and found
a “Goldilocks” pattern in verbal descriptions. However, all such stimuli were static
visual images, whereas experiences of complexity in the world often involve more
dynamic cues. For example, we can appreciate the complexity of a dancer’s movement,
a bird’s flight path, or even the trajectory of a tricky baseball pitch. Such experiences
are interesting not only because they involve an additional property (i.e., motion),
but also because they are temporally extended, and so necessarily involve not only
perception but also (at least some form of) memory. Does the pattern we have been
exploring extend to such cases?
Experiment 3 tested this by asking subjects to observe a disk moving around the
display, and to give a spoken description of its motion sequence. We manipulated mo-
tion complexity by varying how many times the disk changed its direction throughout
the sequence, and asked whether the number of direction changes might be related
to spoken descriptions by the same characteristic inverted-U-shaped pattern.
5.1 Method
5.1.1 Subjects
As stated in our pre-registration, we aimed for 300 usable subjects for this experiment;
to reach this target sample, we recruited 320 subjects total.
5.1.2 Stimuli and Procedure
We generated 120 moving paths, involving 6 “levels” of direction changes (1, 2, 4,
7, 12, and 20). Each path was 630 pixels long in total. To ensure that any changes
in direction would be clear enough for subjects to observe, the shortest segment of
arose in Experiment 2 (positive line: F (1, 38) = 39.12 , p < 0.0001; negative line: F (1, 118) = 143.7
, p < 0.0001). For Experiment 3, we set the break point at 0.3 and found a significantly negative
line (F (1, 98) = 143.7 , p < 0.05), but a non-significant positive line (though the relevant effect was
in the predicted direction: F (1, 38) = 1.38, p = 0.24). This overall pattern encouraged us that the
inverted U-shaped relationship we explore here is relatively robust to different analytical approaches,
though of course future work could employ experimental designs that are better suited to this test.
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any motion sequence (i.e., the minimum distance between two turning points) was at
least 30 pixels long, and the smallest turning angle was 10 degrees. The disk moved
at a speed of 200 pixels per second, resulting in a full motion-animation lasting 3.15
seconds.
The experiment otherwise proceeded in the same way as Experiments 1 and 2,
with the following changes. Subjects saw 2 instances of each # of direction changes,
randomly chosen from the 20 paths that were generated for each level, resulting in
2× 6 = 12 trials shown in total. On each trial, a red disk first appeared in a random
position on the screen, and then subjects pressed a button labeled “Start motion” to
begin the sequences. After the sequence was over, the disk disappeared and subjects
were instructed simply to “describe what the ball did”. (They were not permitted to
replay the animation.)
5.2 Results and discussion
17 subjects were excluded for giving extremely short descriptions or uploading low-
quality audio files, leaving 303 subjects with analyzable data. From these subjects,
3599 audio clips were successfully uploaded to the server (indicating a rate of suc-
cessful uploading of 99.0%). Of these files, 185 (5.1%) could be processed as input
but not transcribed; finally, another 169 (4.7%) of files were excluded for being only
one word long. This left 3245 audio files included in our final analysis (90.2% of
all uploaded files), resulting in approximately 27 unique description clips for each
of the 120 animations. The average duration of these included speech files was 11
seconds (MIN=2, MAX=58, SD=6), and the average description length was 22 words
(MIN=2, MAX=97, SD=13).
Given the demands on memory, one might have expected descriptions of these
stimuli to simply plateau (e.g., once a subject’s memory capacity was reached), rather
than dip downward past a certain point. However, the same striking inverted-U-
shaped relationship emerged again here in Experiment 3, with a clear and grad-
ual drop-off in description length from moderate complexity to high complexity.
Once again, a 2nd-degree-polynomial model (R2 = 0.17 , F (2, 117) = 11.76 , p <
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2.22 × 10−5) revealed an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the complexity of
moving paths and the number of words used to describe them, with the squared-
complexity term being significantly negative (b = −3.13, 95%CI = [−4.79,−1.46],
t = −3.70, p < 3.27 × 10−4). As in previous experiments, this term was also sig-
nificant in a mixed-effects effect model (b = −28.47, 95%CI = [−45.73,−11.22],
t = −3.23, p = 0.0016).∗∗ Thus, even with dynamic stimuli, subjects’ verbal descrip-
tions showed a “Goldilocks”-like pattern.
6 Semantic Analyses
The experiments reported here revealed an inverted-U-shaped relationship between
the objective complexity of a stimulus and the length of the verbal description that
subjects generated to represent this stimulus. We have interpreted this pattern along
the lines of the “programming” example from Figure 2 — a sense that overly complex
objects are represented in the mind as having a more “random” or “patternless” un-
derlying explanation. Is there any evidence for this interpretation, beyond the number
of words themselves? To further understand the relationship between verbal descrip-
tions and stimulus complexity, we analyzed the content of the words spoken, in two
follow-up exploratory analyses: One analysis (reported below) explores the number of
“random” words that subjects used. The other analysis (reported in Supplementary
Material S1) examines the frequencies of the words used in subjects’ descriptions.
6.1 Do subjects use more “random” words?
To explore the possibility that subjects interpret more complex stimuli as being more
“random”, we identified a small number of “keywords” that indicate randomness and
patternlessness. We entered the words “random” and ”patternless” into a thesaurus
and identified the words “random(ly)”, “irregular(ly)”, “odd(ly)”, “disorganized”,
“crazy”, “strange”, and “weird” as keywords that were both (a) aligned with the
∗∗As in Experiment 2, we pre-registered a linear model and an exponential model in addition to
a quadratic model. Here, the linear model reached statistical significance (R2 = 0.070 , F (1, 158) =
8.85 , p = 0.0035), while the exponential model failed to converge.
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concepts we had in mind, and also (b) spoken with some meaningfully non-zero fre-
quency in our experiments. (For example, the word “arbitrary” also appeared as a
result of this keyword search, but not even a single subject in any experiment used
this word in any of their descriptions.) The use of such “random” words would in-
dicate exactly the sort of “lossy” compression we discussed earlier, since describing
a shape as “random” or “crazy” leaves out the particular way or reason it has that
property (just as describing a long string of 1s and 0s in terms of a program that
randomly chooses 1s and 0s summarizes the pattern but loses the particular sequence
that was generated). We then asked whether these words were more likely to appear
in the verbal descriptions of complex stimuli.
Indeed, there was a strong correlation between objective stimulus complexity and
the frequency of “random” words, in all three experiments (Shape: r(158) = .42,
p = 4.22 × 10−8; Matrices: r(138) = .76, p = 2.2 × 10−16; Motion-Path: r(118) = .59,
p = 1.08 × 10−12) (Figure 7). In other words, subjects were much more likely to
describe extremely complex shapes, matrices, and motion-paths as “random” than
they were for simple or moderately complex stimuli, just as would be predicted by an
account of “lossy compression” in the representations of such stimuli.††
This analysis also suggests that shorter descriptions for overly complex stimuli do
not merely result from subjects “giving up” in describing the stimuli. For example, it
might have been that subjects don not believe they will be able to capture the detail
they would like to in their description, and so simply stop their descriptions early.
But while that may of course be part of the explanation here — and it would not be
an entirely uninteresting one (after all, knowing when to give up must rely in part on
a representation of complexity in the first place) — the present analysis shows that it
couldn’t be the whole explanation: Subjects are not just ’interrupting’ their descrip-
tions and stopping; they are actively attributing randomness and patternlessness to
the stimuli, and for the complex stimuli in particular.
††Note that this was only an exploratory analysis; we mentioned in our pre-registration that
we would examine the content of the spoken words, but not at the level of the specific keywords
used in this analysis. However, this pattern was not limited to the particular keywords we chose.
For example, the pattern remained robust and highly significant even with only three keywords —
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Figure 7: Results from an analysis exploring the use of words indicating “random-
ness”. Across all three experiments, subjects consistently and reliably used more
“random” descriptors for increasingly complex stimuli.
7 Discussion
What is the relationship between complexity in the world and complexity in the
mind? Whereas it may seem intuitive that more complex stimuli would generate
more complex representations of such stimuli, the experiments reported here suggest
an alternative (or additional) possibility: that the complexity of a stimulus’ repre-
sentation may vary as a quadratic function of the stimulus’ objective complexity. By
asking subjects to freely describe stimuli whose “objective” complexity was system-
atically manipulated from very simple (e.g., triangles and rectangles, highly regular
dot-arrays, and a moving disc making one brief turn) to very complex (e.g., ex-
tremely irregular “zigzag” shapes, maximally disorganized dot-arrays, and a moving
disc turning 20 times), we found that subjects initially generated longer descriptions
to represent more complex stimuli, but then passed a “sweet spot” after which their
descriptions shortened (rather than continued to increase in length or remain at a
plateau). Across these distinct categories of stimuli, the results showed an inverted-
U-shaped relationship between the length of verbal descriptions and the underlying
complexity of the stimuli themselves — a “Goldilocks” effect relating these two no-
tions of complexity.
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7.1 “Description length” in language and mind
Exploring the length of freely generated verbal descriptions is, to our knowledge, a
new approach for studying the nature of internal object representations. But why
think that language — especially the spoken descriptions analyzed here — offers the
right kind of access to such representations? Of course, linguistic descriptions are
only one way to represent the world, and there are many intervening cognitive steps
between seeing a stimulus and verbally describing it. Indeed, the effects we observe
here could arise from perception (how complex the objects look, as a function of their
objective complexity), conceptual representation (roughly, how complex we interpret
them to be upon seeing them), memory (e.g., if the motion paths in Experiment 3
are remembered as being differently complex than they really are), and of course the
translation of any of these representations into speech.
Nevertheless, our use of linguistic descriptions here doesn’t imply that they are
some kind of “pure” or “direct” window into one’s underlying mental representations;
instead, as is reflected in our analyses themselves, our interest in linguistic descriptions
lies in their utility for comparing representations across different stimuli (whatever
the nature of those representations might be). Whatever cognitive constraints apply
to transforming a perceptual representation into a linguistic one presumably hold for
any stimulus one observes (at least in the context of a single experiment above); and
so it is the pattern of such descriptions — how they vary as a function of stimulus
complexity — that we believe provides insight here. Moreover, linguistic descriptions
have certain advantages over other, more conventional measures. For example, unlike
more typical measures from vision science (e.g., subtle differences in reaction time that
require sensitive measurements and emerge only after hundreds of trials), linguistic
descriptions are easily recorded, and even a single trial can be interpreted. At the
same time, unlike other more explicit measures (e.g., “ratings” of complexity on a
numerical scale), linguistic descriptions derive from processes that are far more natural
and universal, requiring little to no special instruction (e.g., explanations of how to
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use a certain scale, etc.); subjects in our experiments simply spoke in whatever way
felt best.
In other words, even if some other measures of complexity (e.g., ratings) might
reveal a linear (rather than quadratic) relationship between objective and subjective
complexity, we suggest that there is a special and even unique value inherent to the
linguistic description we collect here. Indeed, the value we see in such descriptions
is precisely that they are descriptions. Many information-theoretic approaches to
perception and cognition hold that the mind represents stimuli in the world by trans-
forming them into a format akin to the computer programs appearing in Figure 2
— e.g., as instructions for generating such stimuli (Feldman & Singh, 2006). And
so studying such representations using measures that are themselves formatted as
descriptions may offer a new kind of insight (as it did in the present studies), in ways
that make it a valuable addition (though certainly not a replacement) to cognitive
psychology’s methodological toolkit. (Similarly, recent and creative work has explored
connections between visual processing and subjects’ drawings of visual stimuli [Davis
et al., 2019; Fan et al., 2018]. We think those studies carry a similar kind of value,
owing in part to the generative nature of such “visual production” tasks.)
This work also joins a small but influential number of recent studies that have
made connections between visual complexity and linguistic production. For example,
subjects choose longer words to label objects that have more parts (Lewis & Frank,
2016), in ways that suggest a connection between complexity and word-choice. Ad-
ditionally, subjects who freely produce instructions to identify a target within a grid
of distractors (e.g., to pick out a certain green square appearing within a field of red,
green, and blue squares and circles) show sensitivity to the complexity of the grid,
with delayed speech onset for more complex displays (Elsner et al., 2018). Our work
adds to these contributions data that is perhaps even richer (involving full sentences
and paragraphs rather than just a single word; Lewis and Frank, 2016) and less con-
strained (involving a freely spoken description using whatever criteria the subject
prefers, rather than a more specific task involving picking out a target; Elsner et al.,
2018). All such studies, however, testify to the usefulness of linguistic descriptions as
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tools for studying other processes in the mind (Perry et al., 2018; Schulz et al., 2020;
Zettersten & Lupyan, 2020), in ways that have yielded previously unknown insights
about those processes.
One outstanding question is to what degree the quadratic relationship revealed
here by verbal descriptions reflects a more general mental representation of complex-
ity. Though we explored three fairly diverse kinds of stimuli within the domain of
visual perception, complexity is an attribute that can be assigned to almost any stim-
ulus we encounter, in ways that go far beyond the present work. Within the domain
of visual stimuli, one possibility could be to explore images with a high degree of
symmetry or self-similarity; a highly symmetric shape, for example, may have a high
degree of skeletal entropy but a simpler mental representation that is not captured by
this measure. And of course many other kinds of stimuli could be explored as well,
including stimuli in other sense modalities and even more abstract concepts that go
beyond mere sensory experiences (see Complexity and Beyond below).
7.2 Complexity and descriptive language(s)
The preceding discussion repeatedly invokes the notion of “language”; but of course,
our study explores only a single natural language (English). Does the pattern we
discover here hinge on this choice? Consider the “programming” example from our
Introduction (Figure 2): Many of the programs in this example only get to be “short”
because they include certain predefined functions (e.g., list multiplication) that are
already recognized by the relevant compiler. By analogy, some of the “short” verbal
descriptions we obtained do something similar: A description like “almost a perfect
square with one corner chopped off” (Figure 5) requires first knowing words like
“square”, “corner” and “chopped”. Importantly, such terms may not be universal
across languages: For example, cross-linguistic agreement in naming even simple
shapes may be surprisingly low (Majid et al., 2018), such that short descriptions in
one language needn’t imply short descriptions in another.
However, one reason to suspect some cross-linguistic universality in the connec-
tion between complexity and language comes from other work. For example, Lewis
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& Frank’s (2016)’s study of conceptual complexity and word length (where subjects
choose longer names for more complex concepts) included cross-linguistic data from
80 languages, finding surprising universality in their observed pattern. Though the
pattern they found was linear rather than quadratic (with increasingly complex ob-
jects receiving increasingly complex names), we nevertheless take this earlier work
to suggest that, given some mapping between objective complexity and linguistic
complexity (whatever that mapping may be), that mapping may be unlikely to vary
arbitrarily across languages. Of course, settling this question empirically (by explor-
ing freeform verbal descriptions of complex stimuli in other natural languages) marks
an opportunity for future work.
Another kind of “cross-linguistic” investigation might explore artificial or con-
structed communication and notation systems, in addition to natural languages. For
many specialized activities, practitioners have developed codes for efficiently rep-
resenting actions or states relevant to those activities. For example, the knitting
community uses a set of abbreviations and conventions that compose into “formula”-
like codes for producing a complex pattern; for example, the formula “CO even # of
sts. R1: * K1, P1. Repeat.” specifies a complex sequence of knitting actions that
are understandable to a knitter who can read the notation. (Similar examples exist
for chess moves, origami folds, and so on.) One possible difference between these
notation systems and natural languages is that the former is intended to losslessly
or deterministically convey information. Future work, then, might ask whether an
inverted-U pattern would emerge even in such a highly structured and efficient cod-
ing system — e.g., if a knitter were to describe an extremely complex pattern in a
paradigm similar to the one we use here.
7.3 Complexity and beyond
A final contribution of the present work is the general nature of both (1) the data
we have collected, and (2) the freely-spoken-description method itself. Though we
have applied this method to the study of visual complexity, and drawn particular
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conclusions from the results yielded by this method, future studies and analyses may
go far beyond the questions (and answers) we offer here.
First, beyond the theoretical conclusions that we draw from the spoken descrip-
tions we have collected, other researchers may well find value in them for other pur-
poses. For example, researchers interested in different but related visual-linguistic
concepts — such as concreteness, nameability, or mappings between images and
sounds (as in, e.g., the “kiki”/“bouba” effect; Köhler, 1929) — might explore this
corpus for patterns relevant to those questions (e.g., “rounder” sounds spontaneously
generated for “rounder” images). Second, the pipeline for collecting many thousands
of free spoken descriptions may prove useful for other research questions as well, in-
cluding other explorations of complexity. For example, a natural extension of the
current work would be to explore spoken descriptions of simple and complex stimuli
in other sensory modalities (e.g., simple and complex auditory stimuli), as well as
instances of complexity that go beyond perception itself. For example, the length of
freely spoken descriptions could be used to examine subjective representations of the
complexity of a story (e.g., if a subject were asked to summarize that story; Chen et
al., 2017), a scientific theory or concept (e.g., if a subject were asked to explain that
theory or concept; Feldman, 2000), or even various social structures and networks
(e.g., if a subject were asked to describe who is friends with whom, which judges or
politicians vote together, and so on; Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008).
Though such questions are beyond the present work, they represent new and
promising opportunities for this method. Indeed, a persistent challenge in the study
of complexity has long been to find a measure that can apply to the many different
stimuli and domains that cause us to experience complexity. Incorporating notions
of “description length” has long been seen as a promising step in this direction; here,
we’ve explored the utility of taking this approach one step further, by pursuing a
connection between computational and linguistic versions of this notion.
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